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 1 
Abstract 
 
This paper takes as its starting point the assertion that current rangeland 
management in the central Eastern Cape Province (former Ciskei) of South 
Africa, is characterised primarily by an ‘open-access’ approach.  Empirical 
material drawn from three case-study communities in the region is used to 
examine the main barriers to management of rangeland as a ‘commons’.  The 
general inability to define and enforce rights to particular grazing resources in the 
face of competing claims from ‘outsiders’, as well as inadequate local institutions 
responsible for rangeland management are highlighted as being of key 
importance.  These are often exacerbated by lack of available grazing land, 
diffuse user groups and local political and ethnic divisions.  Many of these 
problems have a strong legacy in historical apartheid policies such as forced 
resettlement and betterment planning.  
 
On this basis it is argued that policy should focus on facilitating the emergence of 
effective, local institutions for rangeland management.  Given the limited grazing 
available to many communities in the region, a critical aspect of this will be 
finding ways to legitimise current patterns of extensive resource use, which 
traverse existing ‘community’ boundaries.  However, this runs counter to recent 
legislation, which strongly links community management with legal ownership of 
land within strict boundaries often defined through fencing.  Finding ways to 
overcome this apparent disjuncture between theory and policy will be vital for the 
effective management of common pool grazing resources in the region.      
 
Key words: Communal lands, institutions, grazing management, fencing. 
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Introduction 
 
Extensive livestock production from natural rangeland areas remains an 
important aspect of agricultural production and rural livelihoods in many parts of 
the world (Niamir-Fuller and Turner, 1999; Reid et al., 2008).  The key feature 
connecting many of these systems is that rangeland used for grazing is held and 
administered as a common property, or common pool resource (Toulmin et al., 
2004).  Both Berkes et al., (1989) and Ostrom et al., (1999) consider common 
property resources as those that share two important characteristics.  The first is 
that exclusion (or control of access) of users to these resources is difficult.  The 
second is that each user is capable of subtracting from the welfare of others. 
 
Inherent in this definition is the potential for the over-exploitation of common 
property resources as epitomised by the ‘tragedy of the commons’ scenario 
famously articulated by Hardin (1968).  However, subsequent empirical and 
theoretical research suggests that this negative outcome constitutes just one of 
several alternative scenarios and that in many parts of the world effective 
governance systems are in place, which allow common property resources to be 
utilised on a sustainable basis (e.g. Berkes, 1989).  Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop 
(1975) were amongst the first to explicitly recognise the major failing of Hardin’s 
paradigm in its confusion of common property with ‘open access’.  Since this 
time, there has been considerable development of the so-called ‘new 
institutionalist’ paradigm, which recognises that the commons can be managed 
sustainably on a communal basis and formally defines the social and institutional 
environment necessary to facilitate this (Berkes et al., 1989; Ostrom, 1990).    
 
The parameters that distinguish common property from open-access regimes 
have been concisely outlined by Bromley (1989) and Ostrom (1990).  According 
to Bromley (1989, pp. 871), a common property regime (CPR) consists of  
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“…a well-defined group of authorised users, a well-defined resource that the 
group will manage and use, and a set of institutional arrangements that define 
each of the above, as well as the rules of use for the resource in question.”  
Conversely, in open access situations users have privilege with respect to the 
use of the resource as nobody has the legal right to exclude them.  However, 
they have no actual rights to the resource (Bromley, 1989).   
 
This interpretation of common property has itself been subject to considerable 
debate.  Cousins (2000) has argued that an emphasis on defined resource 
boundaries is unsuited to many African grazing systems, where boundaries tend 
to be inherently ‘fuzzy’ to accommodate extensive, opportunistic herd movement.  
In contrast, Alden Wily (2008) highlights well-defined boundaries as a 
prerequisite to establishing secure tenure over common pool resources. The 
centrality of rules for resource use in the new institutionalist approach has also 
been questioned.  In Africa, institutions and rules are often informal and flexible 
and access to resources is often secured through complex social networks and 
negotiation (Cousins 2000 and 2007).  Thus, current common property 
paradigms remain contested.  Nevertheless, the general division between 
common property and open access regimes continues to be recognised and has 
important implications for the management of communal grazing resources and 
their preservation in the longer term.   
 
In South Africa, common pool grazing resources have been subject to 
considerable state interference in the way they are held and managed (De Wet, 
1987; Yawitch, 1988).  This has also occurred in other parts of the world 
(Woodhouse et al., 2000; Peters, 2004), but what is almost unique in the South 
African context is the sheer scale and time period over which this has taken 
place.  The historical legacy of minority rule has given rise to a situation in which 
communal rangelands are almost exclusively confined to the former homeland 
regions of the country.  These areas, designated under colonial rule and 
formalised under apartheid, constitute just 13% of the total land in South Africa 
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and were created as reserves in which the bulk of the black population was 
forced to reside (Cousins, 2000).  Some 12.7 million people (about 30% of the 
national total) still live in these areas (Statistics South Africa, 2001).   
 
The central Eastern Cape region, which constitutes the focus of this study, 
includes the former homeland of Ciskei and the adjacent ‘Border’ region.  Here a 
particularly complex history of state-controlled land use planning has had a 
strong influence on the way in which rangeland is now accessed and managed 
by the indigenous Xhosa people.  This began in the middle of the nineteenth 
century, when the colonial authorities started to deprive the Xhosa of their 
extensive, traditional grazing lands and to settle them on a permanent basis in 
newly created ‘black reserve’ areas (Hebinck and Van Averbeke, 2007).  
Individuals were allocated residential and arable land under title with access 
rights to a surrounding defined commonage area for grazing.  This represented a 
fundamental shift in agricultural production from a system based on seasonal 
transhumance and shifting cultivation, to one that was effectively agro-pastoral in 
nature with crop production occurring on private plots and grazing on communal 
rangeland within fixed boundaries.  The loss of pastoral mobility, combined with 
continuous cultivation of single plots, increased pressure on local resources.  By 
the early part of the twentieth century this had resulted in extensive land 
degradation in some areas and a number of conservation and land management 
programmes were instigated by the government, in response (Beinart, 2003).  
Probably the most important of these was ‘betterment planning’ first introduced 
during the 1930s (De Wet, 1987; Beinart, 2003).  Its imposition was particularly 
thorough in the former Ciskei, with about 79% of areas subject to some degree of 
planning by the early 1970s (Trollope and Coetzee, 1975).   
 
The betterment process was concerned primarily with improving land use and its 
most tangible manifestation was the introduction of extensive contouring on 
arable land allocations and the reinforcement of existing divisions into rangeland, 
arable land and residential land through the use of fencing (De Wet, 1987).  
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Concomitant with these physical alterations was the introduction of a system of 
improved land management, which was frequently enforced by the state.  This 
was primarily oriented towards agriculture and included the active management 
of rangeland for livestock production.   An important feature of this was the 
rotational grazing of fenced range camps.  This generally took the form of the 
one-herd-four-camp system, whereby one grazing camp was rested for the entire 
year and the remaining three were grazed on a rotational basis (Trollope and 
Coetzee, 1975; Forbes and Trollope, 1991).  This system was perpetuated under 
state control in the Ciskei until the 1970s, when the South African Bantu Trust, 
responsible for its enforcement, was dissolved and control devolved by default to 
individual communities (Forbes and Trollope, 1991).  
 
Another example of government-imposed social engineering, which was of 
importance in shaping population pressure and land access within the region, 
was the resettlement of Africans forcibly removed from so-called ‘black spots’ 
during the apartheid era.  These ‘forced removals’ began during the late 1950s in 
an attempt to realise the separate development goals of apartheid.  There was a 
considerable amount of resettlement in the former Ciskei, although the 
redistribution of people was far from uniform (Surplus People Project, 1983).  An 
important driver of this resettlement was the consolidation of the Ciskei homeland 
during the 1970s and early 1980s (Wotshela, 2001).  This consolidation process 
was an attempt by the apartheid government to create an autonomous, and 
geographically continuous, Ciskei homeland by redrawing its original boundaries 
and relocating any black people that lay outside them.  The process involved the 
loss of several outlying and non-contiguous former districts of the Ciskei and their 
replacement with a number of so-called ‘released areas’, which consisted 
primarily of white commercial farms bought up by the South African government 
and allocated to the new Ciskei (Wotshela, 2001).  The impact of this land 
reallocation was enormous, with some 50,000 refugees choosing to leave the 
ceded districts and be resettled in the newly acquired released areas in the north 
of Ciskei (Surplus People Project, 1983).  As a result these areas became some 
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of the most overcrowded and poorly resourced within the Ciskei.  Lack of 
available sites meant that many families were never allocated land and simply 
became squatters on existing land or occupied neighbouring farms (Wotshela, 
2001).   
 
Despite concerted research efforts in a number of different parts of South Africa 
(e.g. Ainslie, 1999; Peden, 2005; Allsopp et al., 2007; Moyo et al., 2008), we are 
only beginning to understand the effect this legacy of systematic state planning 
has had on the way common property grazing resources are now held and 
managed in communal areas.  Nevertheless, the South African government has 
enacted legislation, such as the Communal Property Associations (CPA) Act 
(1996) and, more recently, the Communal Land Rights Act (CLRA) (2004), which 
seeks to acknowledge and give legal status to the ownership and management of 
land on a communal basis.  Underpinning this is the idea that effective CPRs are 
already in place in communal areas or will spontaneously emerge in response to 
secure land rights.  This concept has been strongly challenged by several 
commentators who hold that many of the key foundations for successful common 
property management are simply not fulfilled in the Eastern Cape region at 
present (Ainslie, 1998; Bennett and Barrett, 2007).  Specifically, the erosion of 
traditional institutions involved in land administration, extensive social 
stratification, ethnic divisions and excessive problems of landlessness and 
overcrowding in these former homeland areas have been highlighted as potential 
barriers to the functioning of effective, egalitarian systems of common property 
management (Ainslie, 1999).   
 
Thus, there is much about the current functioning of property regimes in 
communal areas that remains poorly understood.  Addressing this knowledge 
gap is imperative if common property institutions are to be effectively tailored to 
the contemporary conditions of communal livestock production in South Africa.  
Building specifically on the work of Ainslie (1999) and Bennett and Barrett (2007) 
in the region, this paper aims to characterise the grazing management regimes 
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currently in operation in communal areas of central Eastern Cape Province.  It 
uses three case study villages to explore the current and historical property 
regimes associated with communal grazing systems in the region and interprets 
this in the context of socio-political and natural resource constraints.  It concludes 
by examining the general implications of the findings for the restructuring of 
institutions associated with common property resources as a whole in South 
Africa.   
 
 
Method  
 
Study Sites 
The three sites used for the study were Allanwater in Lukhanji Local Municipality 
and Lushington and Roxeni in Nkonkobe Local Municipality (Figure 1).  They 
were selected to represent the considerable socio-political and ecological 
heterogeneity in the region.    
  
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
Data collection 
Primary data collection was undertaken at all three communities during July 2006 
and involved a combination of RRA and traditional interview approaches, to 
facilitate triangulation.  This began at each village with an overview of the 
different resources available through a participatory mapping exercise, which 
involved as many of villagers as possible and was complemented by the 
construction of a timeline of important events in village development (Mikkelsen 
1995).  Subsequently, an informal semi-structured group interview was 
undertaken with about 10-15 individuals at each village to provide greater detail 
about rangeland access and grazing management (Mikkelsen, 1995; Robson, 
2002).  These individuals were generally key livestock owners, mainly older 
males.  At Roxeni, this was augmented by individual, semi-structured interviews 
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with key informants, including the chairman of the local farmer’s association 
(Robson, 2002).  Interviewees were purposively selected from the group work, to 
provide greater depth based on their personal experience and different 
perceptions of changes in resource use.  Finally, transect walks were undertaken 
around each settlement with purposively selected key informants, to help 
corroborate the information from the previous work and facilitate elimination of 
inconsistencies (Mikkelsen, 1995).   
 
This empirical work was complemented by concomitant secondary data 
collection, which provided the background to the sites in terms of the basic social 
and agro-ecological data that were available.   
 
 
Results 
 
Findings from the three villages are grouped under key headings, beginning with 
a background overview of the settlements followed by an outline of the grazing 
resources and their management in more detail.   Table 1 summarises the key 
socio-political and ecological features of each village. 
 
Socio-historical and geographical overview 
Although the three research villages lie within in relatively close proximity to one 
another (Figure 1), they differ markedly with respect to many of the social and 
ecological factors that characterise this highly heterogeneous area. 
 
Historically, Roxeni is distinct from the other two villages in that it has a relatively 
long history of settlement.  Together with the neighbouring villages of Gaga and 
Ely it formed part of the Gaga Tribal Authority, which was planned by colonial 
surveyors during the 1860s, with land allocation under quitrent tenure1
                                               
1 Quitrent is a form of land title allocated to Africans under colonial rule, which provided secure 
tenure on provision of annual rental fee. 
.  As part 
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of this system, land was formally subdivided into an area of common grazing and 
an arable land allocation, where the villagers had their fields.  The current extent 
of each of these is 978 ha and 125 ha, respectively giving a total area of 1103 ha 
for the village (DALA, 1997).  In contrast, Allanwater and Lushington are 
relatively recent ‘villages’ established on released areas during the political and 
geographical reordering of the Ciskei during the 1970s.  Both are composed of a 
number of formerly white-owned, commercial livestock farms although they differ 
considerably in their spatial arrangement.   
 
Allanwater consists of a single settlement, the origins of which can be traced to 
the illegal occupation of the released farm ‘Allanwater’ in 1976 by a small group 
of refugee families who had arrived from the ceded Glen Grey district of the 
former Ciskei (Wotshela, 2001).  Although this released farm was not designated 
for occupation a settlement was established (‘Diphala’) and in 1986, this was 
formalised when the local Department of Agriculture intervened and allocated 
120 residential sites under communal tenure.  However, no formal tenure was 
granted over arable plots, nor was there any official demarcation of grazing land 
(Wotshela, 2001).  Since this time the village has expanded considerably and 
although it is still referred to as “Allanwater” it now includes portions of several 
other adjacent former farms, amounting to some 5,000 ha in total extent (M. 
Goqwana, pers. comm.).   
 
In contrast, the village of Lushington consists of four distinct settlements; 
Elundini, Elukhanyweni, Khayelitsha and Ekuphumleni.  These are distributed 
over an extensive area, and have complex and very different histories of growth 
and development.   Elukhanyweni (‘Eluk') and Khayelitsha are located close 
together and were the first to be established during the late 1970s, as small 
settlements of former farm workers.  These were subsequently expanded through 
the migration of people from the overcrowded and degraded Glen Grey and 
Herschel areas of the former Transkei.  This migration actively continues, mainly 
involving relatives of existing residents.  Elundini is the most geographically 
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isolated settlement, situated some 2 km from Eluk and Khayelitsha.  Its origins 
are somewhat different, with most inhabitants having been forcibly removed from 
the nearby Tyume Valley area in 1983, to facilitate the building of a large dam.  
During the mid-1980s, these three settlements were formally surveyed by the 
Department of Agriculture, which approved the allocation of residential and 
arable land, although without formal title.  Ekuphumleni is a much more recent 
settlement founded by individuals looking to break away from the other 
settlements.  Importantly, it has been established without formal land allocation, 
on an area of land designated as arable.  This has caused resentment amongst 
other villagers at Lushington, many of whom consider it a squatter settlement.   
 
The three villages also differ in terms of key development indicators.  Whereas 
Roxeni is relatively wealthy (mean annual household income of R 18,842), 
Lushington (mean annual household income of R 5,369) and Allanwater (mean 
annual household income of just R 3,473 and >50% of households with no cash 
income at all) are relatively poor in cash income terms.  The same disparity is 
also evident in educational attainment, with over 97% of inhabitants at Roxeni of 
20 years of age or greater having received at least a basic primary education, 
whereas 17% of those of equivalent age at Lushington and 26% at Allanwater 
have received no formal schooling whatsoever (Statistics South Africa, 2001).  
These data help to corroborate the social and geographical identity of these 
villages. Roxeni is effectively a commuter settlement benefiting from close 
proximity to a main highway and the nearby towns of Alice and Fort Beaufort 
(Figure 1), whereas Lushington and Allanwater are relatively isolated, rural 
settlements where people depend more on government social transfers and their 
local resources for a livelihood.  Allanwater’s largely pastoral identity is 
underlined by the fact that almost all households own livestock and most are 
active in marketing their animals, which enables 16% of households to make a 
livelihood out of full-time farming (King, 2002).  Furthermore, livestock holdings at 
Allanwater are considerable with 1,006 cattle, 1,560 sheep and 1,263 goats 
recorded during 2002 (ECDA, 2002).  This gives a mean holding of 16 cattle, 55 
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sheep and 18 goats per household, which is very high for the region (Ainslie, 
2002; Van Averbeke and Bennett, 2007).  In comparison, overall holdings at 
Roxeni amounted to 361 cattle, 274 sheep and 783 goats in 2006 (B.S. Mlumbi, 
pers. comm.), which represented a marked decline from the 452 cattle, 438 
sheep and 1,122 goats held at the village in 1997 (DALA, 1997). 
 
The regional heterogeneity of the natural environment is also represented in the 
three villages.  Roxeni, Lushington and Allanwater are situated at mean 
elevations above sea level of around 600, 900 and 1500 m, respectively.  
However, this increase in elevation does not produce an increase in mean annual 
rainfall (MAR) as might be expected, since there is a general trend of decreasing 
rainfall with distance from the coast (Marais, 1975).  Indeed, Roxeni has the 
highest MAR of 616 mm (B.S. Mlumbi, pers. comm.), with a co-efficient of 
variation (CV) of 0.22, although the local veld (rangeland) classification is False 
Thornveld of the Eastern Cape, a form generally representative of areas of lower 
rainfall (DALA, 1997).  MAR at Lushington is estimated through extrapolation at 
600 mm (CV 0.24) and the local veld type is karroid shrub with Dohne and 
Highland Sourveld at higher elevations.  At Allanwater long term (1955-2004) 
rainfall data are available from nearby Waterdown Dam, which suggests a MAR 
of 472 mm (CV 0.32).  The local rangeland is composed of two main veld types, 
Dry Cymbopogon-Themeda veld and Karroid Merxmullera Mountain Veld (King, 
2002).  The relatively low CVs of rainfall at all three sites underline the fact that 
the grazing ecology of the region is predominantly equilibrial in character making 
much of it amenable to semi-intensive management through techniques such as 
rotational grazing and resting (Scogings et al., 1999).   
 
Grazing management 
Grazing at all sites mostly involves the use of formally designated rangeland 
(veld) areas but also makes use of the arable land allocations, which are opened 
to grazing during the dry season as an additional forage reserve.     
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Management of rangeland grazing 
Given that it has existed as a planned settlement for more than a century longer 
than the other two villages, Roxeni has an unsurprisingly more complex history of 
engagement with rangeland management.  Nevertheless, for a long period after 
its initial planning, grazing management at Roxeni appears to have followed a 
fairly consistent pattern.  According to some of the older men at the village, the 
original range area was extensive and divided into nine discrete sections 
(‘camps’ as the villagers referred to them) by natural features such as small 
watercourses and erosion channels.  A system of rotational resting was practised 
(urawulane), whereby one section was rested for a period of one year and the 
remaining eight were grazed simultaneously.  Each year the rested section 
changed.  The decision concerning resting was made by the headman of the 
village during a meeting involving the local men.  It was then the responsibility of 
individual livestock owners to ensure that their stock did not graze in the rested 
area and also to ensure that livestock from neighbouring villages did not 
encroach on Roxeni’s grazing land.  Contravention of the grazing rules resulted 
in animals being impounded and owners fined to facilitate their release. 
 
The arrival of betterment planning in the area resulted in several changes in land 
use.  Early betterment efforts at Roxeni were fiercely contested, as there was an 
initial proposal to move the entire community to establish a white-owned 
commercial fruit operation.  As a consequence, when betterment was finally 
implemented in 1965, much of the available grazing had been reallocated to the 
neighbouring villages of Gaga and Kwezana.  What little grazing land remained 
was fenced into four camps surrounded by a perimeter fence, in line with grazing 
management policy at the time.  The management system also changed 
significantly.  Rotational resting was retained in one of the camps for a period of 
one year but grazing of the three active camps was now undertaken on a 
rotational basis.  Decisions concerning both of these factors were made centrally 
by a newly formed ‘Bantu Trust’ located in nearby King Williams Town and 
administered by the village headman and an appointed grazing committee.  At a 
 13 
practical level enforcement was undertaken by a local ranger who was selected 
from the village and paid by the government.  Fines for non-compliance 
continued as previously.    
 
Centralised control over grazing management disappeared during the 1970s with 
the demise of the Bantu Trust.  However, a system of internal management using 
the betterment fences persisted until the popular overthrow of the Ciskei 
government of Lennox Sebe in 1990.  Immediately after this the headman system 
disintegrated and in this institutional vacuum rotational resting and grazing 
practices were abandoned and the camp and perimeter fencing was removed.  
With the fencing now almost completely gone, livestock from Roxeni and the 
surrounding villages currently free-range over a considerable area of common 
grazing land, with little or no centralised control on their movement.  However, 
institutions associated with land use have re-emerged.  Undoubtedly the most 
important of these is Roxeni Farmer’s Association (RFA), created in 1997 as a 
Common Property Association (CPA), with legal status.  This is open to all 
members of the community upon payment of an annual membership fee, has an 
elected committee (including a Chairman), and appears to be responsible for all 
aspects of arable and livestock management.  However, in the absence of 
fencing to provide strong boundary delineation, it seems incapable of exercising 
any form of control over when and where livestock graze, which creates 
considerable pressure on key resource areas at different times of the year.  In 
particular, a relatively large dam constructed during the early 1980s in one of 
Roxeni’s camps draws in considerable numbers of cattle from the surrounding 
villages, especially during the dry season.  The RFA is currently reluctant to 
alienate their fellow pastoralists in neighbouring villages by cutting off access to 
this resource, although this movement of animals may be accelerating local soil 
compaction and erosion.   
 
In comparison to Roxeni, Lushington and Allanwater have relatively brief histories 
of engagement with rangeland management.  Institutional control at both villages 
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has gone through two distinct phases.  Initially, Lushington was incorporated into 
the AmaGwali Tribal Authority and a headman was appointed at the village.  His 
role was both as intermediary for the articulation of the needs of the village to the 
tribal authority and in the settling of local disputes relating to matters such as 
stock theft.  Although most of the fencing was still in place when the commercial 
farms were inherited by the new settled inhabitants, there seems to have been 
little central enforcement of rotational resting or grazing of the rangeland, even 
under the homeland dispensation of the 1980s.  Rather, livestock were allowed to 
graze on a free-ranging basis over all camps simultaneously.  As at Roxeni, 
when the headman structure was abandoned in 1990, what remained of the 
fencing was destroyed during the subsequent period of civil unrest.  Thus, the 
current resource management situation involves no fencing at all, apart from in 
those boundary areas adjoining either government ranches or the remaining 
commercial farms in the area.   
 
Although starting from similar beginnings the early history of grazing 
management at Allanwater was very different.  After initial incorporation into the 
Thembu Tribal Authority, a headman, his associated committee and a ranger 
were appointed from within the village.  However, in contrast to the laissez-faire 
approach at Lushington it appears that a system of rotational grazing was 
retained.  Moreover, it appears that grazing management decisions were still 
community-driven.  The community would, for example, decide which camp(s) 
were to be rested during the coming year.  The headman’s role in this seems to 
have been largely administrative, as he would be required to complete the 
necessary paperwork to inform the local magistrate of this decision.   
 
The second phase of institutional development involved the formation of 
democratically elected Resident’s Associations (RA) at both villages, following 
the civil unrest of the early 1990s.  At Lushington this structure currently consists 
of a separate committee at each of the four settlements, which together feed into 
an overarching ‘umbrella’ RA.  These committees have an important function in 
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the allocation of residential and arable land at each settlement, particularly to 
new arrivals from outside the village.  The main function of the RA seems to be 
as a point of contact with external institutions such as NGOs and the local 
Department of Agriculture rather than resource management per se.  At 
Allanwater the RA alone is responsible for both of these functions.  However, the 
key point of institutional departure between the two settlements is the presence 
of an additional civic structure at Allanwater, Vukani Farmer’s Association (VFA), 
charged with livestock management.  This is analogous to the RFA at Roxeni and 
consists of all members of the village led by a committee of 6 elected members 
and requires the payment of an annual membership fee.  This covers costs such 
as the purchase of chemicals used in the communal dipping of village livestock 
and the repair of community fencing.  The management committee of VFA 
decides which camps are grazed and at what stage of the year.  It is also able to 
punish deviant behaviour through the imposition of fines.  Importantly, this gives 
an implicit sense that, in addition to receiving other communal benefits, livestock 
owners at Allanwater are collectively managing their grazing resource.   
 
These differences in institutional arrangements are reflected in the levels of 
grazing management in operation at each settlement.  At Lushington a ‘free for 
all’ grazing scenario now effectively prevails, with grazing taking place on an 
entirely ad hoc basis, even involving animals from neighbouring villages.  There 
are no formalised rules to control when and where livestock graze, and indistinct 
community boundaries characterise certain areas.  The only enforcement is that 
practised by white farmers on adjoining commercial grazing areas, who impound 
trespassing communal stock and force the owner to pay a considerable fine to 
retrieve them.  In contrast, grazing at Allanwater has consistently been under 
some form of community management.  The current management system 
involves the complete resting of at least two of the camps each year and grazing 
of the remainder.  However, resting is not undertaken on a pre-determined, 
rotational basis but rather is dictated by the perceived condition (heavily grazed 
or not) of a given camp.  An important factor in this is the presence of wire grass 
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(Elionurus muticus) as those camps with greater proportions of this tend to be 
rested more often.  Furthermore, grazing of the open camps is not continuous 
and seems to be driven largely by season and availability of water as well as 
proximity to the residential area of the village.  The camps on the eastern side of 
the village are grazed during the growing season, as access to permanent water 
is problematic here and the animals have to rely on temporary rain-fed ponds.  
During the subsequent dry season the eastern camps are closed and animals 
graze the camps on the western side, as more permanent water points are 
available here.  The need to graze smallstock in relative proximity to the 
residential area, due to the (perceived) threat of theft or attack by wild animals, 
also means that most of the camps surrounding the homesteads are grazed by 
sheep on a continuous basis.  Thus, the grazing system currently in operation 
appears to be based on a combination of indigenous knowledge and flexibility in 
response to practical constraints. 
 
Management of arable grazing       
Unlike grazing of the formal rangeland camps, control over which differs 
markedly between the villages, grazing of the arable lands as an additional 
forage reserve for livestock is subject to much greater control at all three sites. 
 
At Roxeni this control is facilitated through the use of fencing.  Although the 
arable land allocation as a whole is fenced off from the formal grazing area only a 
very small number of individual plots have perimeter fencing, erected and 
maintained by each respective title-holder.  These are the only fields in which 
crop production is now undertaken, as the threat of livestock damage is a major 
deterrent to cropping outside fenced fields.  Fencing of individual plots has also 
provided greater autonomy to a limited number of owners in the use of these 
areas for the grazing of their livestock.  Crop residues in these plots may be 
grazed on an individual or communal basis depending on the preference of the 
owner of the field.  Some owners even retain rights over the grass available in 
their fenced allocations and use it exclusively for their own stock.   
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Fencing is also used to control the grazing of arable land at Lushington.  Most of 
this has been retained from previous commercial farming and many people now 
have access to individually fenced arable plots, which they maintain themselves.  
These people are able to exercise exclusive grazing rights over these areas as 
dry season forage reserves for their own livestock.  If a summer crop has been 
grown, the residues will be reserved for their cattle, which are then grazed in the 
field.  This is strictly enforced and any other livestock that gain access to this 
resource will be driven away or even impounded by the field owner.  In unfenced 
areas, maintenance of individual rights over crop residues is only possible if they 
are cut and carried to the homestead for grazing.  This seems to be the norm, as 
very few individuals leave crop residues to be grazed in situ.   
 
As at Lushington, crop production at Allanwater has been perpetuated in the 
areas demarcated as arable under the previous commercial farming system but 
there is now considerable sub-division of plots.  Although the arable blocks retain 
their perimeter fencing no individual plots are fenced.  Nevertheless, a large 
proportion of these plots continue to be cultivated each season and the residues 
are used to supplement available livestock grazing.  However, these are not 
grazed in situ but rather are cut and carried to the homestead for livestock 
consumption as at Lushington.  The only in situ grazing that takes place on the 
arable lands involves dry season forage crops.  Several individuals continue to 
cultivate oats and barley for livestock consumption at this time, often inter-
cropping them with maize.  These are grown primarily for winter lambs and ewes 
in milk although animals must be closely watched to ensure that they graze only 
the forage crop that has been cultivated by the owner.  Thus, there is a strong 
desire to preserve individual grazing rights over both maize residues and forage 
crops.   
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Perceptions of change and rangeland quality  
At Roxeni, livestock owners perceive the historical changes that have occurred 
within the management system in a variety of different ways.  Whilst some regret 
the loss of the fenced camps due to the flexibility it gave in livestock 
management, most are happy that the fenced rangeland perimeter is now gone 
as it no longer formalises the boundary of the post-betterment grazing lands and 
enables cattle to range over a far wider area than was previously possible.  
However, there is a feeling amongst some owners that the absence of fixed 
boundaries combined with the presence of the permanent dam has led to 
increased pressure on local rangeland resources during critical periods such as 
the dry season.  The overall quality of grazing resources within the village was 
perceived as quite low with few species of good quality being identified during 
transect walks.  Instead areas dominated by Acacia karroo bush, or which had 
been invaded by substantial amounts of unpalatable karroid shrub, were 
highlighted.  Much of the remaining grass component is dominated by poor 
quality perennial species such as Aristida congesta and Cynodon dactylon.  Soil 
erosion is also heavy and has been documented as a significant problem in the 
area (Weaver, 1989).  The poor quality of the range and extensive soil erosion is 
corroborated by a local soil conservation report, which determined the local 
carrying capacity at just 18 ha/AU, which is very low for the veld type (DALA, 
1997).   
 
Like Roxeni, the rangeland resource at Lushington is generally of poor quality.  In 
areas of lower elevation, the grass sward tends to have greater cover but is 
dominated largely by unpalatable species such as Elionorus muticus.  At higher 
elevations the grass sward is patchy and consists largely of heavily grazed tufts 
of Themeda triandra supplemented by less palatable perennials such as 
Cynodon dactylon and Sporobolus africanus and annuals such as Eragrostis 
capensis.  There is also considerable intrusion by small unpalatable shrubs such 
as Felicia filifolia.  A strong feeling prevails amongst several of the livestock 
owners from Lushington that fencing of the rangeland is necessary to allow them 
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to manage it more effectively as a grazing resource and to try and rehabilitate 
areas that had become unproductive.  This is somewhat ironic given that the 
community was unable to maintain the fencing it inherited from the commercial 
farmers.  However, the issue of fencing is very political.  It was suggested that 
the destruction of the original fencing was, at least partly, a deliberate attempt to 
make a break with an oppressive past during a turbulent period of unrest in the 
early 1990s.  At the time the research was undertaken, there was a proposal 
from the local Department of Agriculture to re-fence a substantial proportion of 
the rangeland perimeter at the village.  Whilst this would provide much-needed 
short-term work for some, it was a highly sensitive issue, which was strongly 
contested by some sectors of the community.     
 
In contrast to the other two villages, the grazing resource at Allanwater is in 
relatively good condition, with a local carrying capacity of 7-9 ha/AU in most 
areas (G. Jordaan, pers. comm.).  This is reflected in the relatively high 
productivity of stock at Allanwater.  For example, mean wool clip during 2001 was 
3.9 kg per sheep (King, 2002).  This compares favourably with 2.3 kg per sheep 
in the degraded communal area of Herschel and is close to commercial yields 
within the Eastern Cape, which historically averaged around 4.5 kg per sheep 
(EDA, 1994 in Vetter, 2003).  At a subjective level this is also underlined by the 
perceptions of the local people themselves, 89% of whom believed their grazing 
resources to be in good or very good condition, when questioned as part of an 
earlier study (King, 2002). 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Discussion 
 
These case studies not only illustrate the extent to which CPRs are being 
practised in central Eastern Cape Province but also highlight several key axes of 
struggle in their operation, as discussed below.  
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Institutions 
The lack of effective institutions charged with overseeing rangeland management 
has repeatedly been highlighted as one of the main limitations to the existence of 
functioning CPRs in both the Eastern Cape (e.g. Ainslie, 1999; Bennett and 
Barrett, 2007; Moyo et al., 2008) and in other areas of South Africa (e.g. Atkinson 
et al., 2006; Alden Wily, 2008).  In this study, the critical nature of these 
institutional structures in resource management is underlined by the community 
of Allanwater, which has successfully separated agricultural management (dealt 
with by VFA) from broader community issues (dealt with by the RA).  VFA, whilst 
ostensibly still ‘nested’ within the broader framework of the RA, has the autonomy 
to deal specifically with agricultural issues and thus to act independently and 
flexibly in the management of the grazing resource.  This accords with Ostrom’s 
(1990) emphasis on the value of nesting institutions within broader structures to 
facilitate effective management.  Thus, the autonomy of VFA obviates the need 
to involve the RA in day to day management decisions, leaving it free to focus on 
higher level issues associated with land allocation and engagement with outside 
agencies.   
 
The democratic legitimacy of VFA also limits the possibility of ad hoc, unelected 
‘committees’ associated with grazing management existing in parallel with RA 
structures, as occurred in several post apartheid communities in the former 
Ciskei (Ainslie, 1998; Bennett and Barrett, 2007).  Indeed, in the absence of 
strong institutions specifically charged with resource management grazing tends 
to be uncoordinated and individually driven.  This is illustrated by the situation in 
Lushington, as well as numerous other settlements in the region such as the 
village of Guquka, where an ineffectual RA was supplanted by an ad hoc grazing 
committee, which served only the interests of a landed minority (Bennett and 
Barrett, 2007).  Although Lushington has committees within each settlement, 
charged with land allocation, they seem to play no role in managing the grazing 
resource which, in any case, should ideally rest with a structure that is 
representative of all four settlements.  Indeed, the fundamental constraint to the 
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introduction of such a structure appears to be the fragmented nature of the 
‘village’ itself.  This underlines the continuing legacy of apartheid’s social 
engineering policies in constraining current community cohesion and 
development in the former homeland areas.   
 
Political division  
A key aspect of the institutional weakness apparent at Lushington seems to be 
the politically divided nature of the village.  As pointed out above, the settlements 
of Eluk and Khayelitsha have a common origin in their foundation by local ex-
farm workers.  In contrast, the inhabitants of Elundini, as refugees from a 
neighbouring district, have no historical connection with the area and the 
settlement has a strong, separate identity of its own.  The new ‘squatter’ 
settlement of Ekuphumleni has little political identity and appears to still be 
viewed with resentment by the other, more established settlements.  These 
institutional weaknesses may also be exacerbated by the apparent ‘open door’ 
policy to new arrivals being adopted at Eluk and Khayelitsha.  A considerable 
level of immigration, particularly from the Herschel and Glen Grey areas, 
continues to be sanctioned by the committees of each settlement, seemingly on 
the basis of ethnic and familial ties.  Such political and ethnic division, as a 
consequence of apartheid’s divide-and-rule policy, is apparent throughout the 
former Ciskei.  For example, in the Tyefu area of Peddie, Ainslie (1999) has 
shown how the political and ethnic divisions fomented by apartheid have 
contributed to institutional dissonance in the control and management of natural 
resources.  The legacy of apartheid planning also lives on in other parts of South 
Africa, where political divisions over resource management continue to exist, 
particularly between landed (politically powerful) and landless groups (e.g. Lebert 
and Rohde 2007).      
 
In contrast, the strong institutional structure present at Allanwater, is supported 
by an environment of relative political unity.  Most of the inhabitants of the village 
have a common origin and, apart from a brief influx of outsiders during the early 
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1980s, the settlement has expanded largely through natural increase (Wotshela, 
2001).  Under these circumstances people appear to have political cohesion and 
a willingness and ability to cooperate for a perceived common good.    
 
Social stratification 
It is widely accepted that the majority of households in the central Eastern Cape 
now depend on cash income from jobs (either earned by resident householders 
or sent back from urban areas in the form of remittances) and state transfers 
(mainly pensions) for their livelihoods.  Income generated within villages, 
particularly from agriculture, forms only a minor component of the average 
income of most households (Hebinck and Van Averbeke, 2007).  Moreover, 
although livestock act as a form of livelihood security (rather than direct cash 
income) in many households, ownership is increasingly concentrated in the 
hands of a relatively small minority (Ainslie et al., 2002; Van Averbeke and 
Bennett, 2007).  It is thus difficult to characterise settlements in the region as 
genuinely agrarian in nature as many now effectively function as ‘commuter 
villages’ for local towns.  This process of ‘depeasantisation’, although particularly 
marked in this area of South Africa, is also being experienced in many other parts 
of Africa (Bryceson, 2000 cited in Peters, 2004).  
 
The relationship between socio-economic stratification and level of effective 
commons management is evident in the case villages.  Roxeni forms part of the 
rural commuter belt for the local town of Alice (Figure 1) and livelihoods depend 
largely and increasingly on social transfers and waged income.  This is reflected 
not only in the relatively high mean household income in Roxeni but also by the 
near absence of crop production and the relatively low and declining level of 
livestock ownership.  Although issues surrounding land access and management 
are of continuing importance at the village, the prevailing social structure means 
that few people depend on the land for their livelihood.  This may partly explain 
why, despite the existence of RFA, the village has been unable to engage in 
effective rangeland management.  In contrast, Allanwater demonstrates that 
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some settlements in the former Ciskei remain fundamentally agrarian in character 
and, importantly, support effective CPRs for rangeland management.  There is an 
almost ubiquitous engagement with agriculture amongst the inhabitants of 
Allanwater, with a significant proportion of households depending on agricultural 
activities for their livelihoods (King, 2002).  Furthermore, most households at the 
settlement are very poor, suggesting limited engagement with waged income 
(Statistics South Africa, 2001).  This largely shared sense of social identity 
appears to have been important in fostering the communal ethos necessary for 
effective CPR management.    
 
Resource definition 
In addition to social differentiation, a more pressing influence on the inability to 
engage in co-ordinated rangeland management at Roxeni is the lack of definitive 
boundaries and the associated problem of an amorphous user group, particularly 
during the dry season.  Under these circumstances, attempts at range 
management from within the village are fruitless when outsiders are not engaging 
with the same management rules.  Both Bromley (1989) and Lawry (1990) have 
highlighted the inability to enforce resource boundaries and thereby control user 
access as a key constraint to the management of common pool resources.  More 
recently, Alden Wily (2008) has emphasised the importance of boundary 
definition as a precursor to the secure ownership and management of commons 
resources.   
 
Roxeni’s struggle to enforce historical rangeland boundaries stems partly from 
the very high local pressures on limited rangeland resources.  This is 
symptomatic of the planned areas of the former Ciskei, where a long history of 
natural population growth, combined with limited land allocations and forced 
resettlement policies, has created an environment in which localised pressure on 
resources is high, with the breakdown of mechanisms of land management and 
associated land degradation (Ainslie, 1998, Cocks et al., 2001).  However, the 
lack of boundary definition cannot be considered entirely a result of external 
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forces.  Rather, there is a feeling that the community, at least in part, chooses not 
to enforce its boundaries to facilitate access to more extensive grazing beyond 
the village, particularly the areas lost under betterment planning.   
 
Moreover, this lack of defined rangeland boundaries finds some resonance with 
more recent interpretations of common property theory in its application to 
African grazing systems.  Cousins (2000) emphasises how ‘fuzzy’ boundaries, 
where territories are not divided into discrete land units that only one group has 
access to, are an inherent feature of common property regimes in Africa and 
facilitate access to key resources at different times of the year.  Thus, the current 
situation at Roxeni might be interpreted in this way, with fuzzy boundaries 
enabling access by all local stock to a greater degree of spatial heterogeneity in 
terms of available forage and to permanent water during the dry season at 
Roxeni dam.  Despite this, it remains difficult to construe the current system as a 
genuine CPR as the ‘fuzziness’ in place seems to have emerged by default and 
there remains a distinct lack of co-ordination between settlements or any form of 
basic rule structure associated with resource access and management.      
 
Availability of grazing 
The lack of adequate grazing resources at Roxeni contrasts sharply with 
Lushington and Allanwater, which have access to considerable areas of 
communal rangeland.  Allanwater in particular, seems to have benefited from a 
relatively small user group and a large allocation of land.  Much of this fortune 
has an historical basis.  The decision to occupy Allanwater provided the original 
squatter families with a definite resource advantage over their neighbouring, 
formally settled counterparts (Wotshela, 2001).  In this respect, Allanwater might 
effectively be considered as a geographically isolated oasis of relative (natural 
resource) privilege.  Such historical privilege, whilst rare, does occur in other 
parts of the former Ciskei.  Cocks et al., (2001, pp. 5), outline a very similar 
scenario in which the “….fortuitous land expropriation policies of the former 
(Ciskei) government” has enabled the Masakane community (a group of former 
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farm workers and their families) to lay claim to extensive grazing land comprising 
several former commercial stock farms, despite being surrounded by 
overcrowded communities with limited grazing access.  Likewise, the village of 
Koloni in the Middledrift area, benefited from being a former mission station and 
pioneer site for betterment in the region, receiving a large allocation of land and 
no influx of people forcibly removed from ‘black spot’ areas (Ndlovu, 1991).  This 
has been fundamental in the perpetuation of a recognisable CPR at the 
settlement (Bennett and Barrett, 2007).  This suggests that spatially inadequate 
grazing resources may be a fundamental constraint to the maintenance or 
development of CPRs within many communities, a view corroborated by Ainslie 
et al., (1998).  At the broader level, the importance of spatially adequate grazing 
in supporting functionally recognisable CPRs has been underlined by 
comprehensive research undertaken in the Namaqualand area of South Africa 
(Allsopp et al., 2007) and in other parts of Africa (e.g. Niamir-Fuller, 1998; Niamir-
Fuller and Turner, 1999).           
 
Fencing 
Related to this is the importance of fencing in exercising control over access to 
grazing resources.  Although, historically, fencing has been fiercely contested 
and politically contentious, its retention seems to be correlated with the 
perpetuation of basic CPRs in the region.  This is evidenced not only by the case 
of Allanwater but also by the other communities such as Koloni, discussed 
above.  It also finds support in the case of the Tyefu area of Peddie, where 
fencing was resisted, and an open access grazing regime now prevails and 
rangeland is highly degraded (Ainslie, 1999).  There is a sense that local 
communities may now be unable to engage in effective communal management 
of grazing resources without fencing.  Persistent state intervention in the region 
through extensive betterment and acquisition of fenced commercial farms for 
communal occupation has encouraged a doctrine of rangeland management 
premised on the need for grazing boundaries to be defined through perimeter 
fencing - a view that still finds active support within the provincial Department of 
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Agriculture.  There is a clear irony in communities such as Lushington and 
Roxeni, which destroyed their fences as political statements, expressing a desire 
for their reinstatement to facilitate boundary definition.  This serves to underline 
the endemic ‘fencing complex’ (i.e. fencing consistently being seen by both 
communities and authorities as a panacea for grazing management), which 
prevails in the region.  Although this scenario finds some parallel with the 
organisation of the government grazing schemes in communal areas of 
Zimbabwe (Scoones, 1999), it is in marked contrast to the situation in many other 
parts of Africa where ‘fuzzy’ boundaries are the norm and institutions controlling 
the flexibility in resource access this necessitates are well developed (Cousins, 
2000).    
 
Private grazing of arable lands 
The empirical findings from all three villages suggest that grazing of available 
arable forage during the dry season is controlled almost exclusively on an 
individual basis, irrespective of the extent of communal management being 
exercised over rangeland grazing.  Importantly, the retention of individual rights 
over arable forage does not appear to be related to de jure security of tenure, as 
suggested by Bennett and Barrett (2007), as private rights over crop residues 
and forage are exercised at both Allanwater and Lushington where there is no 
formal title to land.  Nor is secure fencing around individual plots a pre-requisite 
for retention of individual rights over forage.  At Allanwater and Lushington, rights 
over crop residues in unfenced fields are exercised through cut and carry.  
Furthermore, rights to cultivated dry season forage, which is grazed in situ, are 
also retained at Allanwater by the vigilance of individual owners, despite the 
complete absence of fencing around individual plots.  However, in situ communal 
grazing of forage does seem to occur at all the settlements on a default basis, for 
example, where individuals have grown a summer maize crop in an unfenced 
plot and have not harvested the residues.  Under these circumstances there 
seems to be an implicit acceptance that owners have forfeited their individual 
rights.   
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This strong distinction of property rights between arable plots and rangeland is 
borne out by studies from other parts of Africa.  Scoones (1999), for example, 
has documented how private tenure rights can be retained over crop residues 
and grass through harvesting or use of fencing.  In a more extreme case of 
commoditization, Southgate and Hulme (2000) outline how, in some parts of 
Kenya, crop residues are rented out to pastoralists by individual producers during 
the dry season.  
 
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
 
It is clear that in the communal grazing lands of central Eastern Cape Province, 
struggles continue in most areas, both within and between communities, over the 
management of common pool grazing resources.  Current struggles over 
common property grazing occurr along a number of axes, which are often 
interlinked.  Indeed, some appear to be almost ubiquitous and thus critical to the 
effective functioning of common property management systems in the region.  
Importantly, these provide an insight into the types of interventions that may help 
to develop and strengthen common property regimes which are suited to local 
grazing systems.  Just as Cousins (2000) has argued for a broader interpretation 
of the ‘new institutionalism’ in an African context, the application of common 
property theory in South Africa, particularly in the central Eastern Cape region, 
requires further development.  The region has a tumultuous political history, 
which is largely unique, even within colonial Africa, and it is vital that 
interventions give adequate recognition to the considerable social, economic and 
ecological (in the sense of endowments of and command over natural resources) 
heterogeneity that this has created.   
 
One critical intervention will be the creation of effective institutions for the 
management of rangeland grazing.  A specific aspect of this will be the 
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development of institutions responsible for cooperative governance of local 
rangeland resources (as emphasised by Ainslie, 1999), which has registered 
virtually no progress in the post-apartheid period.  This is paramount, as one of 
the fundamental constraints to the functioning of CPRs in the region is the 
limited, and now effectively inadequate, grazing resources to which many 
communities have legitimate access (Ainslie et al., 1998).  Whilst land 
redistribution does offer a possible solution for communities in proximity to 
commercial farms and/or state land, most will have to continue to make do with 
the little they already have and simply make more effective use of it.  Thus, a key 
part of this will be the creation of local institutions, which have a resource 
management remit that extends beyond existing, often (ecologically and socially), 
arbitrary community boundaries and which can facilitate grazing at a more 
extensive scale.  Importantly, this will also require the development of tenable 
and enforceable resource management rules to avoid simply legitimising existing 
open-access scenarios.  One approach to this might be to ‘nest’ institutions of 
cooperative resource management within higher level local governance 
structures, which have broader administrative functions (Lawry, 1990).  Where 
co-management is required between several neighbouring villages, as at Roxeni, 
the local municipal ward committee might be the appropriate place to embed this.  
However, this concept might also be extended to communities consisting of 
separate settlements, such as Lushington, where management within the 
community is paramount.  Under these circumstances the community’s own 
umbrella RA structure, might be an appropriate entity in which to nest such an 
institution. 
 
The potential for the formation of such cross-community, cooperative 
management institutions and their political legitimacy is currently limited by 
existing legislation.  The Communal Property Associations (CPA) Act (1996), 
gives communities legal rights in holding and managing property in terms of a 
written constitution (Republic of South Africa, 1996; Cocks et al., 2001), and the 
more recent Communal Land Rights Act (CLRA) (Republic of South Africa, 
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2004), has also persisted with an approach of vesting land ownership and 
management rights within discrete and well-defined ‘communities’.  Although 
these approaches may prove relatively effective where resources are well 
defined and pressure is relatively low (e.g. VFA at Allanwater), the Roxeni (RFA) 
case demonstrates their inefficacy when historical village boundaries are no 
longer enforceable in the face of heavy local grazing pressure.  Rather, a 
legislative approach which has greater flexibility in its application according to 
local needs is required.  Specifically it must be used to cater more effectively for 
those communities with limited land access, by formalising statutory and 
enforceable rangeland access and grazing management rights (where agreed) 
across existing, often arbitrary, boundaries.  One interesting solution to this might 
be the split property rights approach advocated by Sandberg (2007), whereby 
several entities (communities) are able to own land collectively and equally.  This 
would enable current rangeland access patterns across several communities to 
be formalised on a legal basis.   
 
Another vital aspect of this will be the provision of government support in helping 
communities to develop and maintain effective institutions charged exclusively 
with cooperative resource management, and embedding these structures at the 
appropriate level of local governance (Cocks et al., 2001; Cousins, 2007).  
However, this is unlikely to be straightforward since, as Sandberg (2007, pp. 614) 
points out, institutional development depends on rights and duties, which have 
already been established, leaving only ‘…a narrow space for new institutional 
design efforts’.  Moreover, it is also likely to be time consuming and costly given 
the current absence of such institutions in most areas of South Africa (Mostert 
and Piennar, 2004 cited in Alden Wily, 2008).  In addition, there will need to be 
ongoing support from local agricultural extension services in the development of 
appropriate grazing management regimes, which make best use of available 
ecological heterogeneity in both time and space.  Provision of permanent water 
points will be a critical and costly part of this at many sites. 
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Importantly, in areas such as central Eastern Cape, achieving this will require not 
only national legislative hurdles to be overcome but also locally entrenched 
philosophies of management through fencing.  Whilst fencing may be appropriate 
in some applications (e.g. in managing key resource areas such as arable land 
allocations), in most cases effective resource management will only be possible 
through neighbouring settlements engaging with one another to develop co-
operative management frameworks based on shared rules (so-called ‘social 
fences’) rather than separation by physical boundaries.  Furthermore, it is vital 
that any approach to communal rangeland management acknowledges the 
considerable social stratification that now exists in the region.  The diminished 
dependence on land-based activities for the rural majority means that natural 
resource management, whilst still of clear importance in some areas and 
amongst some sections of communities, is no longer as vital to local livelihoods 
as it once was.  This suggests that local needs must be prioritised on a case by 
case basis and that any efforts at developing natural resource management 
capability must also be complemented by the provision of basic services and 
infrastructure to those whose livelihoods are now firmly tied to an increasingly de-
agrarianised economy.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
 VILLAGE 
FEATURE Roxeni Lushington Allanwater 
Site history Colonial planning, and 
betterment 
Former commercial 
farm 
Former commercial 
farm 
Village structure Single settlement  Four separate 
settlements  
Single settlement 
Origins of 
inhabitants 
Inhabitants have 
common origin and are 
politically unified 
Inhabitants have very 
different origins and 
politically divided 
Inhabitants mostly of 
common origin and are 
politically unified 
Socio-economic 
status 
Inhabitants relatively 
wealthy and educated 
Inhabitants quite poor, 
with limited educational 
attainment 
Inhabitants very poor, 
with relatively little 
education. 
Livelihood basis Cash income-based Mixed Largely agrarian  
Institutional 
control 
Farmer’s Association – 
consistently strong. 
Resident’s Association 
and sub-committees, 
fragmented and weak 
Resident’s and 
Farmer’s Associations, 
centralised and strong. 
Rangeland 
management 
system  
‘Minimum’ CPR 
historically, now open-
access 
Grazing consistently 
unregulated and in 
effect open-access 
Basic CPR in operation 
throughout 
Rangeland 
boundaries 
Historically well 
delineated, now totally 
unfenced and fuzzy 
Defined by fencing in 
commercial areas but 
otherwise unclear 
Well defined all around 
by perimeter fencing 
Rangeland user 
group 
Undefined due to 
encroachment on 
resource by outsiders 
Not entirely clear -
includes all four sub-
settlements but may 
involve others 
Clearly defined as 
individuals from 
Allanwater only 
Rangeland 
management 
rules 
Historically tenable but 
now impossible to 
enforce due to outsider 
claims on resource 
None apparent – all 
management at 
individual level 
Defined management 
system exists but 
sometimes applied in 
ad hoc manner 
Range size Fairly limited Extensive Extensive 
Range condition Very poor Poor Good overall but areas 
of poor quality 
Arable 
cultivation 
Very limited and 
restricted to fenced 
fields 
Widespread and taking 
place in both fenced 
and unfenced fields 
Widespread using 
unfenced plots 
Arable grazing 
rights during dry 
season 
Private grazing rights 
retained over forage 
during dry season 
through enclosure 
Private grazing rights 
retained through 
fencing or cut and 
carry in unfenced fields 
Private grazing rights 
through cut and carry 
or in situ grazing under 
supervision 
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Figure 1: Location of study sites within central Eastern Cape Province. 
 
Table 1: Key socio-political and ecological features of each village. 
 
